Dal 2014 la Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) adotta tassi d’interesse negativi. In particolare, il tasso sui depositi overnight delle banche presso la banca centrale è passato da -0,10% […]
La situazione di crisi legata alla pandemia e le possibili ripercussioni economiche globali, stimate su livelli nettamente più altre rispetto alla crisi del 2008 ed alla relativa coda, […]
La BCE ha commissionato un progetto relativo all’emissione di bond comunitari – Sovereign bond-backed Securities – non collettivamente garantiti che saranno suddivisi per categorie di rischio. La proposta […]
In the last years, the ECB has tried to encourage reforms of the Italy’s labour market including the increasing use of bargaining at the enterprise level. The aim is to contain the growth of wages and to permit higher productivity growth. However, the ECB did not take into consideration the changes in the real variables. In fact after the euro’s adoption, the growth of real wages was lower than the productivity growth. Furthermore, the current incentives system for the decentralized bargaining, that provides a tax benefit on productivity bonuses, seems to increase the territorial dualism North-South.
An empirical analysis by Brancaccio, Fontana, Lopreite and Realfonzo shows that the ECB is not capable of controlling the nominal income trend and therefore also inflation. The following study is in line with the alternative argument, according to which the real task of the central bank is to regulate the rhythm of insolvencies in the economic system.
The economic literaure suggests that restrictive fiscal policies can compromise the stability of banking balances, leading to plans of recapitalization, liquidation and foreign acquisitions. If this reading is accepted, a critical reflection can be made on the new double role of the ECB, whose help is conditional on the adoption of austerity policies and it is now also the Single Supervisor of the European banking system.
The European central bank recently adopted a non-accommodating policy towards the liquidity requirements of Greek banks in difficulty. Many commentators however have pointed out that it acted in violation of the Bagehot rule, which says the role of the central bank should be provide liquidity to commercial banks considered illiquid but not insolvent.